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Abstract. During the Renaissance there was a growing interest for the use of 
diagrams within conceptual studies. This paper investigates the historical and 
philosophical foundation of this renewed use of diagrams in ontology as well as 
the modern relevance of this foundation. We discuss the historical and 
philosophical background for Jacob Lorhard’s invention of the word ‘ontology’ 
as well as the scientific status of ontology in the 16th and 17th century. We also 
consider the use of Ramean style diagrams and diagrammatic ontology in 
general. A modern implementation of Lorhard’s ontology is discussed and this 
classical ontology is compared to some modern ontologies.  
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It is commonplace in modern computer science to present ontologies in terms of 
diagrams. In this way the ontologies are supposed to be more readable than they 
would be if presented as sets of logical formulae. In addition, the use of diagrams has 
been supposed to facilitate and support conceptual reasoning. According to Peirce, the 
use of diagrams in logic can be compared with the use of experiments in chemistry. 
Just as experimentation in chemistry can be described as “the putting of questions to 
Nature”, the conceptual experiments upon diagrams may be understood as “questions 
put to the Nature of the relations concerned” (CP: 4.530). This should not be 
misunderstood. Logic is not psychology. Peirce made it very clear that logic is not 
“the science of how we do think”, but it determines “how we ought to think” (CP: 
2.52). In this way, logic is not descriptive, but, according to Peirce, it should be seen 
as a normative science. In fact, he considered diagrammatical reasoning as “the only 
really fertile reasoning”, from which not only logic but every science could benefit 
(CP: 4.571).  
 However, logicians have had similar views for centuries, although the points 
may not have been stated so elegantly as Peirce did. In particular, diagrammatical 
representation has been regarded as useful within the study of ontology. An early 
example of this is the often cited ‘Tree of Porphyry’. Whether Porphyry actually did 
use diagrams, we cannot say for certain, but the literature on this particular structure 
points in general to a rendering by Peter of Spain from the 13
th
 century. Diagrams 
were used in medieval discussion of conceptual structures, but the emphasis on the 
importance of diagrammatical reasoning within conceptual studies became much 
stronger during the Renaissance. In this paper we intend to discuss the historical and 
conceptual foundation of this renewed use of diagrams in ontology. We intend to 
show that scientists working with the development of ontologies may benefit from 
reflections on this historical and philosophical foundation of their enterprise. In 
section 1, we discuss the historical and philosophical background for Jacob Lorhard’s 
invention of the word ‘ontology’. In section 2, we consider the scientific status of 




 century. In section 3, we shall focus on the use of 
Ramean style diagrams in science in general and in ontology in particular. In section 4 
we discuss selected elements of Lorhard’s diagrammatic ontology. In section 5, we 
discuss how Lorhard’s ontology can be implemented in a modern context using the 
Amine platform, and compare Lorhard’s ontology with some modern ontologies.  








1. The Invention of the Word ‘Ontology’ 
The word ‘ontologia’ is not an original Greek word, i.e., it was never used in 
ancient philosophy. As we have argued in [Øhrstrøm, Andersen, Schärfe 2005] the 
word was constructed in the beginning of the 17th century by Jacob Lorhard (1561-
1609), who, probably mainly for pedagogical reasons, wanted to present metaphysics, 
i.e., the conceptual structure of the world, in a diagrammatical manner. In a sense, 
Lorhard used ‘ontology’ as a synonym for ‘metaphysic’. But by introducing the new 
word he probably also wanted to indicate that the field was being renewed.  
 Jacob Lorhard was born in 1561 in Münsingen in South Germany. We do not 
know much about his life. But it appears that the 10 years younger Johannes Kepler 
met him at Tübingen University, where Kepler is known to have studied in the period 
1587-91. At that time Lorhard was probably a young teacher. Kepler listed Lorhard as 
one of the persons whom he regarded as hostile to him, and he added: “Lorhard never 
communicated with me. I admired him, but he never knew this, nor did anyone else”. 
[Koestler: 235-6] 
 Lorhard was (like Kepler) a Protestant, and he was involved in various 
religious studies and discussions. In fact, the new way of treating and presenting 
conceptual structures signaled by the introduction of the word ‘ontology’ can easily 
been seen in the context of the general openness that characterized academic life 
within the Protestant circles in the late 16
th
 century. This general and scientific 
openness was clearly essential for many of the important contributions to the new 
approach to science which was being developed during the same period, with Kepler 
as one its most important representatives. Clearly, this new approach to science could 
easily be related to discussions regarding worldview in general, and thereby also to 
metaphysics and ontology. 
 Lorhard was deeply interested in metaphysics, understood as the study of the 
conceptual structure of the world. In 1597 he published his Liber de adeptione, in 
which he wrote: 
 
Metaphysica, quae res omnes communiter considerat, quatenus sunt οντα, 
quatenus summa genera & principia, nullis sensibilibus hypothesibus subnixa. 
[1597: 75] Metaphysica, which considers all things in general, as far as they 
are existing and as far as they are of the highest genera and principles without 
being supported by hypotheses based on the senses. (Our translation.) 
 
Lorhard came to the Protestant city St. Gallen in 1602, where he worked as a 
teacher and a preacher. The year after, in 1603, he became ‘Rektor des Gymnasiums’ 
in the protestant city of St. Gallen. He was accused of alchemy and also a heretical 
view on baptism.  He was, however, able to defend himself rather convincingly, and 
his statements of belief were in general accepted by the church of St. Gallen. (See 
[Hofmeier et al. 1999: 28 ff.] and [Bätscher 1964: 171 ff.]) In 1606 he published his 
Ogdoas scholastica, a volume consisting of eight books dealing with Latin and Greek 
grammar, logic, rhetoric, astronomy, ethics, physics, and metaphysics (or ontology), 
respectively.  
 Although Lorhard only used his new word a few times in the book, he did 
present his new term in a very prominent manner letting “ontologia” appear in the 
frontispiece of Ogdoas scholastica. This was probably the very first use ever of the 
term ‘ontology’ in a book. The title of the book is stated as “Metaphysices seu 
ontologiæ” indicating that ‘ontologia’ is to be used synonymously with 
‘metaphysica’.  
 As suggested by Marco Lamanny [2006], it is very likely that Lorhard’s book 
on ontology in Ogdoas scholastica is in fact mainly based on Clemens Timpler’s 
Metaphysicae Systema methodicum [1604], which was published in Steinfurt. 
Lamanny [2006] has convincingly demonstrated that all the essential philosophical 
terms in the book also appear in Timpler’s book with the same mutual relations. 
However, it is evident that Jacob Lorhard in composing his version of the 
metaphysical system made two very important contributions to the understanding and 
presentation of the field:  
1)  He introduced the new word “ontology”, which has been important since 
then in philosophical discourse and much more recently also in computer 
science.  
2)  He presented his material (in fact, all eight books of Ogdoas scholastica) in 
diagrammatical manner representing the conceptual structure in terms of 
graphical relations.  
As we shall see in section 3, Lorhard did his work under the influence of the works 
of Peter Ramus. It should be emphasized that Lorhard in transforming Timpler’s 
metaphysical ideas into Ramean style diagrams did in fact make original contributions 
relevant for the understanding and presentation of the conceptual framework of 
reality. 
 In 1607, i.e., the year after the publication of Ogdoas scholastica, Lorhard 
received a calling from Landgraf Moritz von Hessen to become professor of theology 
in Marburg. At that time Rudolph Göckel (1547-1628) was also professor in Marburg 
in logic, ethics, and mathematics. Göckel apparently also paid great attention to 
Timpler’s work. In fact, he had written a preface of Timpler’s book [Timpler 1604]. It 
seems to be a likely assumption that Lorhard and Göckel met one or several times 
during 1607, and that they shared some of their findings with each other. In this way 
the sources suggest that Göckel during 1607 may have learned about Lorhard’s new 
term ‘ontologia’ not only from reading Ogdoas scholastica but also from personal 
conversations with Lorhard. For some reason, however, Lorhard’s stay in Marburg 
became very short and after less than a year he returned to his former position in St. 
Gallen. Lorhard died on 19 May, 1609. Later, in 1613, Lorhard’s book was printed in 
a second and revised edition under the title Theatrum philosophicum. In this new 
edition the word ‘ontologia’ had disappeared from the front cover, whereas it has 
been maintained inside the book. In 1613, however, the term is also found in Rudolph 
Göckel’s Lexicon philosophicum. Here the word ‘ontologia’ is only mentioned briefly 
as follows: “ontologia, philosophia de ente seu Transcendentibus” (i.e., “ontology, the 
philosophy of being or the transcedentals”). It is very likely that Göckel included this 
term in his own writings due to inspiration from Lorhard. 
 
2. The Scientific Status of Ontology 
Lorhard introduced metaphysics (or ontology) using the Greek term επιστηµη for 
which we in [2005: 429] suggested the translation ‘knowledge’. However, as argued 
by Claus Asbjørn Andersen [personal communication], it appears from the context 
that Lorhard must have used επιστηµη as corresponding to the Latin scientia. Taking 
this into account, Lorhard’s definition of ‘ontology’ becomes “the science of the 
intelligible as intelligible insofar as it is intelligible by man by means of the natural 
light of reason without any concept of matter” [1606: Book 8, p.1]. This science is 
obviously not just any ‘knowledge’ among many other branches of human 
knowledge. Being “the science of the intelligible” it is clearly logically and 
systematically prior to other discipline of the human intellect, i.e., a first philosophy. 
 As mentioned above, ontology according to Lorhard is about what can be 
understood by man “by means of the natural light of reason without any concept of 
matter”, and as emphasized in his Liber de adeptione, it should not rely on 
assumptions based on the senses primarily. This means that in working with the 
ontology we should not involve any concept of ‘matter’. As convincingly argued by 
Claus Asbjørn Andersen [2004: 96 ff.], Göckel’s presentation of ontology includes an 
even stronger emphasis of the importance of abstraction from the material.  In this 
way ontology may be characterized as the study of what can be understood by the 
human intellect organized in a system reflecting the order of the conceptual 
understanding in a proper manner. 
 It is an important guiding principle in Göckel’s ontology that the fundamental 
terms in the structure are organized in pairs of concepts. The same is clearly the case 
in Lorhard’s ontology. His system is presented in terms of dichotomies whenever 
possible, i.e., he probably wanted to divide any complex class of concepts into two 
subclasses characterized by contradictory terms.  
 Lorhard’s approach to ontology was probably very much inspired by the 
Peter Ramus (1515-72), who had strongly criticized Aristotelian scholasticism, and 
who had suggested that the liberal arts should be organised and presented in a new 
manner. Ramus emphasized the importance of mathematics in the contexts of 
knowledge in general, but he also insisted on a practical and operational approach to 
mathematics. As emphasized by R. Hooykaas [1987] Ramus was interested in how 
the making of instruments could support the application of mathematics in the study 
of reality. This interest was probably based on the belief in a mathematical structure 
of the physical and conceptual universe. This view when taken together with the 
practical approach mathematics turned out to be essential for the rise of modern 
natural science. 
 In 1562 Ramus converted to Calvinism, and he was murdered in Paris in the 
St. Bartholomew’s Massacre on August 26, 1572. The fact that he was considered to 
be a Protestant martyr made many intellectual Protestants interested in his ideas. In 





 century.  
 Lorhard (like Ramus) accepted the idea that we may understand reality (or at 
least important aspects of reality) by means of the natural light of reason, i.e., we have 
as rational beings access to necessary truth in mathematics and in reality in general. 
Ontology is the science of the structure of the conceivable truth about the material and 
immaterial world. In this way, ontology may be seen as included in natural theology 
according to which man as a rational being may understand essential aspects of the 
world without having to base his understanding on any special revelation. If seen in 
this way, ontology must be something universal, in principle accessible to every 
rational human being. In addition, ontology does not depend on anything physical, 
although as a science it is certainly very important, since it forms the background for 
our interaction with the world. Given this kind of practical importance, it was obvious 




3. The Diagrammatical Approach to Ontology 
As noted above, Lorhard’s approach to ontology and in particular his use of 
diagrams, was probably very much inspired by Peter Ramus (1515-72), who had 
argued that scientific knowledge at least, for pedagogical reasons, should be 
simplified using diagrams organised in dichotomies.  
 Walter J. Ong [1959: 436 ff.] has pointed out that there seems to be an 
interesting relation between invention of printing and the impact of the development 
associated with Ramus’ ideas. Shortly after the invention of printing the use of tables 
of dichotomies or bracketed outlines of subjects became very famous. As in Lorhard’s 
books the subjects were often organised as long series of dichotomies presented in 
terms of brackets. This way of organising and presenting subjects can also be found in 
manuscripts written before that time, but they seem to have been relatively rare before 
the invention of printing. It is very likely that the new technology of printing 
facilitated the spread of what was considered to be a very impressive and powerful 
way of presenting a subject matter. According to Ong [1959: 437] there was a kind of 




 century. The ideology behind this 
tendency seems to have been that the diagram in a very effective manner, can make 
the conceptual relations clear to us, and that the very conceivability of a term may 
fundamentally depend on its relations to other terms or concepts, i.e., that “words are 
made intelligible by being diagrammatically related to one another” [Ong 1959: 437]. 
 Ramus himself often used diagrams based on dichotomies. As argued by 
Stephen Triche and Douglas McKnight [2004], his main purpose for representing 
knowledge in terms of diagrams was pedagogical. In fact, he argued that following his 
ideas and pedagogical logic the various studies of the liberal arts could be united in 
one course. Triche and McKnight state: 
 
Ramus’s primary intellectual accomplishment was the refinement of the art of 
dialectic by transforming dialectical reasoning into a single method of 
pedagogical logic for organizing and demonstrating all knowledge. In addition, 
his invention of method completes humanism’s transformation of medieval 
scholasticism’s courses of study in the liberal arts into a recursive singular 
course of studies called curriculum. [2004: 40] 
 
According to Ramus this kind of new order in the higher studies should be 
established using the laws of logic (dialectic). Given that logic operates with two 
truth-values, true and false (corresponding to yes/no), this can easily lead to the idea 
of dichotomies. In this way, he believed, that every subject can be represented in 
terms of a diagram of dichotomised concepts. Also, the order in which the concepts 
appear in the diagram is not arbitrary. According to Ramus there is a natural order of 
the concepts, which should used in the construction of the diagram. This order should 
be taken into account when teaching the subject in question. In his own words: 
 
Through the light of artistic method, everything is more clearly taught and 
much more easily understood, since universal, general matters come first with 
subsidiary parts following, and all things arrainged by that wonderful, linking 
organization of antecedents and consequents (Quoted from [Triche & 
McKnight 2004, p.46]). 
  
It is obvious that this view may lead to a high degree of standardisation in teaching, 
since it follows from the Ramean view that there is only one optimal way of 
organising the subject in question, and since every teacher should take this order of 
concepts into account. 
 The Ramean use of dichotomies has often been discussed e.g. in confessing his 
own “leaning to the number Three in philosophy”, Peirce noted that other numbers 
have had their champions, and he gives as an example that “Two was extolled by 
Peter Ramus” [CP: 1.355]. It is in fact quite obvious that Ramus believed that every 
subject can be presented in terms of his dichotomistic diagrams. As pointed out by 
Bruce MacLennan “the Ramean Tree (or Ramean Epitome) proceeds by logical 
dichotomy from the most general term of any subject matter. In effect the Ramean 
Tree is an abstract geometrical diagram of the (supposed) essential structure of 




4. Elements of Lorhard’s ontology 
Jacobus Lorhard presented his ontology in terms of connected Ramean style 
diagrams written in an elaborated manner. This means that he wanted to use the 
principle of dichotomy as far as possible.  Fig. 1 is a translation of the first page of his 
ontology, and the chapter continues with 58 pages of similar structures. The capital 
letters (A, B, C, EE, RRR) refer to continuations on subsequent pages in a way that 
almost resembles modern day hypertext. 
 In the presentation of his ontology, Lorhard uses the Ramean style bracket as 
his basic representational tool.  However, he uses these brackets in three distinct 
ways.  Most commonly, the brackets are a tool for dividing complex terms into two or 
more disjunctive subsets represented by contrasting terms.  For example, infinity is 
either absolute or restricted (§I), necessity is either absolute or hypothetical (§L), 
goodness is either apparent or true (§O), and so on. 
 The second way that these brackets are used is in introducing explanatory 
notes.  This usage occurs only in the very top levels of the tree, and instead of the 
brackets dividing a complex term into two subsets, one branch of the bracket gives a 
further gloss on how a term should be understood and the other then introduces how 
the term may be further divided.  For example, before dividing ‘the intelligibles’ into 
‘nothing’ and ‘something’, there is a note (λóγος) defining what intelligbles are.  (See 
Fig. 1). 
 
The parts of 
metaphysic
(the science of the 
intelligible as 
intelligible insofar 
as it is intelligible 
by man by means 
of the natural light 
of reason without 
any concept of 










a note about ‘an 
Intelligible’.
By most common 
attributis. See C.
Note (logos): An Intelligible is said to be anything, which 




Nothing: This is 
simply not something.
Something: Whatever 
is simply not nothing. 
It is either
Positive, because









Fig. 1 First page of Lorhard’s ontology 
 
He uses the brackets in a third way not to divide one complex term into two more 
specific terms, but to gather two sub-terms back together before dividing them as a 
group.  For example, when Lorhard is discussing time, he first divides it into the 
subgroups of momentary time and successive time.  However, members of both of 
these classes are either real or imaginary, and he indicates this by having opposite-
facing brackets collect the categories of successive time and momentary time together 
before dividing the entire group into that which is real and that which is imaginary 
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of parts according to 
prior and posterior. 
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differences and 
virtual parts are 














of a single 
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Intrinsic, which is 
duration, by which 
a created Being in 
truth
endures in its own 
existence.
Extrinsic, because 
it is duration 
certain and 
determinate,
fixed by will and 
council, partly of
God, partly of 





Fig. 2 Fragment concerning time 
 
Wherever possible, Lorhard divides terms into two, exclusive and exhaustive, sub 
classes.  However, there are cases where this is not possible, such as when he divides 
respective or relative goodness into the three categories of ‘honor’, ‘utility’, and 
‘jocundity’ (§P).  In these cases, it is no longer immediately clear that the chosen 
categories do in fact exhaustively represent the space.  Certainly it is not obvious to a 
21
st
 century person that these three types of respective goodness are the only three 
types, or even that they are mutually exclusive (which Lorhard appears to think they 
are). 
 One thing which is clear is that Lorhard, in making this tree, is not attempting 
to give definitions of classes, but rather divisions (or, as he sometimes says 
distributions) of classes.  This is easily seen, for example in Fig. 1, when he divides 
intelligibles into the two classes ‘something’ and ‘nothing’, as he describes ‘nothing’ 
as that which isn’t something, and ‘something’ is glossed as that which isn’t nothing; 
or when a ‘principle’ is glossed as that on which a principiate depends, and a 
‘principiate’ is glossed as that which depends on a principle (§§VV, vv).  If these 
glosses are taken as definitions of the terms, then circularity results. One must know 
in advance the meanings of the terms before one can proceed to classifying and 
codifying the relationships between the classes. 
 
 
5. A Modern implementation of Lorhard’s ontology 
As part of this investigation, Lorhard’s ontology was translated into English, and 
also into a present-day notation. The problems related to translating the ontology from 
Renaissance Latin to English is discussed in the annotated translation [Lorhard 2007]. 
Here, we shall report some of the most interesting aspects of turning this 400 year old 
system of thought into a modern ontology. Lorhard’s text was represented using the 
Amine platform and resulted in a formal ontology, understood here as a hierarchy of 
types. We are assuming that the Ramean brackets correspond to a subtype relation, 
that is: for the most parts. Certain aspects of the notation will be discussed below.   
 
The use of meta-constructs 
In modern ontologies it can be very difficult to see how distinctions are made, and 
types are derived from these distinctions. In particular, it is often difficult to see 
clearly what the author(s) of a given ontology was aiming at through their 
distinctions, which again makes it difficult to decipher the intention behind the 
represented distinctions. In a context where agents are supposed to operate amidst a 
large number of ontologies, such considerations become increasingly important. To 
some extend this problem can be solved by collecting the supertypes of a type in 
question, but that does not necessarily reveal the strategy by means of which the 
knowledge in question was represented. Lorhard chose to incorporate his comments 
directly into the diagrammatical representation, using the Logos – Distribution 
distinction, mentioned above. Although this part of the representation is presented as 
part of the actual ontology, when dealing with formal ontologies this part should in 
fact be considered a meta-construct, designed to aid the reader to understand how the 
definitions at hand work. This seems like a very elegant solution, although a modern 
implementation requires a separate notation for such information.  
 
The inverted brackets 
The use of inverted brackets as mentioned in Fig. 2. is very widespread throughout 
Lorhard’s ontology, and indeed throughout the Ogdoas. However, the semantics of 
this notation was not initially clear to us, and we did in fact speculate as to whether 
this could be seen as a forerunner of multiple inheritance. A closer study of the 
original texts does, nonetheless, reveal that the inverted bracket is a shorthand 













Fig. 3 The inverted brackets  
 
So in fact the structure shown here can be unfolded as seen below in the left, which 
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Fig. 4 Rendering of the inverted brackets  
 
It is striking that the Renaissance texts all show the hierarchies written from left to 
right, whereas in modern representations it is usual to draw hierarchies in a vertical 
manner. Quite probably, this manner of representation is inherited from Ramus, and 
possibly also became conventionalized through printing practises of that time. The 
shift in style of representation from horizontal to vertical is however interesting 
because it reflects our conceptualization of the models at hand – a condition that is 
also reflected in our use of language, e.g. sub-types. However, the history of such 
preferences in representation style must be left for enquiry elsewhere.  
In terms of translating this ontology into a contemporary system, the shorthand 
notation requires a separate naming of the types that are part of the structure to be 
duplicated. 
 
The top ontology 
The layout of the original text does not offer a single overview of the top structure of 
the ontology. The elaborate system of references guides the reader through the pages 
from section to section. Each section is organized as if one was traversing a tree. The 
top structure can therefore be extracted and reproduced as in fig. 5. 
It is worth noticing that Lorhard’s ontology does not begin with a distinction between 
physical and abstract, as many other ontologies do, but rather the first top distinction 
is between universals and particulars. Universal is then divided into a class of the 
general intelligible and a class defined by common attributes. The particular is 
divided into substantial (on its own) and accidental (through something else). It turns 
out that these distinctions are rather typical in Lorhard’s thinking, and it hints at a 
guiding principle for the construction of many subsequent divisions, as will be 
described next. 
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 Fig. 5 The top distinctions  
 
Iterations  
Throughout the ontology there is an extensive use of repeated terms. As discussed at 
the end of section 4, the reader of the diagrams must follow the path from the earlier 
distinctions on order to grasp the meaning of mentioned of recurring terms, such as 
real and imaginary. See fig. 2 and 5. Such contextual readings are obviously not 
practical in computational environments, but do point to a guiding principle of 
Lorhard’s thinking.  
In terms of Knowledge Representation (KR), some of these recurring distinctions 
can be said to belong to a KR meta-language, employing such terms as: generic and 
specific (which occur 7 times) universal and singular, immanent and transcendent etc. 
Other distinctions are of a more striking, and, in our opinion, also more revealing 
nature since they seem to reflect Lorhard’s metaphysical beliefs and thus give rise to a 
more detailed understanding of his world view. For example, the distinction between 
created and uncreated occurs 3 times, and the distinction between real and imaginary 
occurs 6 times, all in the universal section of the ontology. In the particular section of 
the ontology, real is more often opposed to rational, that is: things that exist in their 
own right versus things that exist through some intelligence.  
The matters of the ontological status of the real and the imaginary certainly deserve 
further investigation in another context. Here, we shall confine ourselves to suggest 
that the extensive use of iterations indicates a principle for handling complex 
knowledge representations, namely that a few select distinctions are applied 
frequently rather that once and for all in a top distinction. This constitutes a problem 
when the ontology is translated into a contemporary KR system in that the repeated 
distinctions seem to be intended to have the same meaning regardless of there they 
occur. Since formal ontologies require unique names for types, we have resorted to a 
numbering system in our implementation. This does not, however, seem to be a 
completely satisfactory solution.  
 
Conclusion 
Lorhard’s use of diagrams was probably inspired by the work of Peter Ramus. In 
fact, they were used in Lorhard’s presentation of all subjects.  This probably had to do 
with the general belief that logic is important for the understanding of reality. 
Realising that logical reasoning can be strongly supported by diagrams, it obviously 
becomes attractive to represent ontology in a diagrammatical manner. Based on the 
belief in a logical structure of reality it also appears to be natural to represent reality 
in terms of the most fundamental logical structure, the contradiction. In this way the 
use of dichotomies in the formal and diagrammatical description of reality becomes 
attractive. The resulting structure is obviously a mathematical structure representing 
the conceptual relations in the world. In this way reality is believed not only to be 
logical but also mathematical, in the sense that there is a conceptual structure that may 
be said to represent a geometry of meaning.  
 All these classical beliefs held by Lorhard and the other founders of the 
Renaissance approach to ontology are to a large extent still held in modern ontology. 
There is, however, one major difference between Lorhard’s and modern ontology. 
According to the classical belief there is only one ontology corresponding to reality 
and truth. There may of course be other suggested structures different from the true 
ontology, but they will simply be false descriptions of reality. According to the 
classical view there will be no room for the alternative ontologies fit for different 
purposes. In other words, whereas an ontological structure in a modern context may 
be seen as a model or a tool fit for certain purposes and unfit for others, an ontological 
structure will classically be much more than a tool. It will be an attempted description 
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